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Abstract 
A model of asset markets with two types of investors is developed and its 
dynamic properties are analyzed. "Optimists" expect on average higher returns 
on the risky assets than "pesaimists" do. The stochastic procesa íor equilibrium 
asset return changes over time as the distribution oí wealth between the two 
types oí investors changes. In the long run, the share oí wealth held by one 
type oí investor may become negligible, but it is a180 poesible íor both types to 
co-exist, depending on the parameter values of the model. Relations between 
this model and sorne econometric models with time varying parameters, such 
as the ARCH (Autoregresaive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) model and the 
STAR (Smooth Transition Autoregresaive) model, are examined. The dynamic 
properties oí another model, regarding investors who use strategies that are 
a bit more complex, are al80 analyzed. "Fundamentalists" believe that the 
asset returns íollow a procesa that is solely determined by íundamentals and 
"contrarians" assume the market is wrong and choose a portfolio that is exactly 
opposite of the market portíolio. Again, depending on parameters, both types 
can co-exist even in the long runo 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent studies in fmance, which inelude Shiller (1984), Black (1986), Frankel and Froot 
(1988, 199Oa, 199Ob), and De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (DSSW hencefonh) 
(1990) among others, stressed the importance of heterogeneous beliefs in asset markets. These 
studies show that models with heterogeneous investors are useful in explaining sorne empírical 
puzzles that cannot be explained by a model witb a representative investor. 
This paper studies a similar model witb hetcrogeneous beliefs to analyze the asset price 
dynamics. We consider an asset market which includes two types of investors, who follow two 
different rule of tbumb strategies. Depending on the relative success of each strategy, the 
proportion of total wealth held by each type of investor fluctuates. If strategy A is more 
successful tban the other strategy B, for example, tbe investors who use strategy A increase tbeir 
wealth more than tbe other investors, invcst more in the asset, and inCl'ease their influence on 
asset pricing. Thus the changes in the distribution of wealtb between tbe two types of invcstors 
affect tbe uset prices, which in turn influence tbe relative suceess of each StrBtegy and again 
change wealtb distribution. Profits, which are random, are use<! for buying back tbe shares of 
the risky uset to create capital gains for tbe ownen, or for paying out dividends to create income 
gains. Thus random profit shoca influence tbe dynamics of tbe asset price and wealtb 
distribution. The uset price and wealth distribution themselves also bccome stochastic processes. 
This paper studies me limiting behavior of these stochastic processcs. Under some paramctcr 
values, we show that the limiting behavior of those dynamics does not ciepend 00 the initial 
condition. 
The most important empírical implication of our model is smootb shifts of the 
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price dynamics. Both the conditional mean and the conditional variance of the asset price change 
over time reflecting changes in the wealth distribution between two types of investors. For sorne 
periods, strategy A may do bettcr than strategy B and enhance its influence. Following sorne 
random shocks to profits, strategy B may become more profitable, and the proportion of wealth 
held by investors who use stratcgy B will inercase. Following sorne other shocks, stratcgy A 
may again become more profitable and regain its influence. In this way, wealth distribution 
fluctuates over time and asset price dynamics show smootb shifts betwccn two extreme regimcs: 
one where all tbe wealth is owned by investors who use strategy A and the otber where all tbe 
wealth is owned by investors who use strategy B. Altbough these extremes never happen if tbe 
limiting distribution of tbe proportion of wealth is ergodic, tbe price dynamics still can show 
substantial variation over time without reaching an extreme. 
Thos our model is useful in explaining an apparent empirical regularity in financial 
markets: namely time varying conditional variance of asset retums. Tune varying conditional 
variance bu becn dcrected by many researchers who estimaced ARCH (Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity) models to financial data. Bollerslev, Chou, Jayaraman, and 
Kroner (1990) surveyed numcrous successful applications of ARCH models in Ílnance. The 
modcl witb the representarlve agent docs not usually have strong implications rOl' the dynamics 
of conditional variance of asset retums. Thus, in ordcr to intcrpret empirical success of ARCH 
models in finance, the standard model has to assume ARCH at the fundamental level, fOl' 
example in tbe process of cash flow. The modcl in this papee can explain time varying 
conditional variance without assuming ARCH at the fundamental level 
Tbe model also implies that the mean growth rate of uset price changes over time, ando 
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changes in the mean are related to changes in the conditional variance. Thus a type of ARCH 
models called the ARCH-M model, which is used to capture shifts in the conditional mean 
associated with changes in the conditional variance, becomes especially relevant for our model. 
Our model is also useful in motivating another statistical model with time varying 
parameters called STAR (Smooth Transition Autoregressive) model. The STAR model was 
applied 10 some aggregate variables like GNP and industrial production by Anderson and 
TeIisvirta (1991). A STAR model assumes that a process is a weighted average of the two 
distinct AR processes and the weight changes over time. Our model also implies thal the usel 
price process shifts between two extremes, although the variable that determines the weight in 
our model (proportion of wealth) enters the price process in a complex way. 
There are several studies of the dynamics of assel prices in the uset market with 
heterogeneous agents. DSSW (1991) considers the wealth accumulation by two typeS of 
investors. noise traders and sophisticated investors. The noise traders have random and biased 
forecuts of the rate of retum and its v~ance, whereu the sophisticated investors have the 
correet forecasts. They show, under some parameter values. that the noise traders' wealth may 
grow faster than that of the sophisticated investors and eventually the noise traders may domínate 
the market One problem of DSSW (1991) is that they ignCR the noise traders' influence 00 the 
uset price. which is the most important point made by models with noise traders. such as DSSW 
(1990). Our model explicidy studies the way the heterogeneous beliefs intluence asset prices and 
examines the price dynamics. 
Another important difference between our paper and DSSW's research is that we do not 
assume the presence of sophisticatec1 investors who have rational expectations and maximize their 
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expected utility. Although the agents in our rnodel use ponfolio strategies that rnaximize an 
expected utility function under sorne assurnptions about beliefs, they do not have rational 
expectations. Thus the agents in this paper deviate from the standard rational consumen in 
economics. In this sen se, our approach is similar to that followed by Blume and Easley (1992). 
They consider the dynamic process of an asset maricet with heterogencous investors, which is 
similar 10 ours. Each type of investor uses different portfolio rules, and the market eventually 
selects the most "6t" rules, in the sense that wealth held by such investors grows faster than that 
of the other investors. One difference between our model and Blome and Easley (1992) is the 
formulation of asset retum. Blume and Easley (1992) assume an exogenous probability 
distribution over the possible pay-out oC the asset. Thus the current price of the asset does not 
influence the rate of retum on an asset that was bought last period. In other words, the assets 
in their model can have only incomc gains and not capital gains. Our model includcs both 
incomc gains and capital gains of asset holding. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model of an asset market 
with two types of investors: optimists who expect a high rate of return for the risky asset and 
pessimists who expect a low rate of retum for the risky asset. The dynamics of the asset price 
and wea1th distribution are derived and characterized. Section 3 studies the asymptotic 
distribution of the plOportions of wealth held by each agent. Section 4 discusses the implicadons 
on conditional variance and relates our model 10 AROI models in econometrics. This section 
also discusses the model's relation 10 another statistical model with time varying parameters 
called STAR. Section 5 considers the investors who use slight1y more complex stratcgies. 
"Fundamentalists" behave similarly 10 optimists and pessimists in Section 2. They maximize the 
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expected utility given their beliefs about the process of the asset retums. "Contrarians" start with 
the assumption that the market on average is wrong, and invest a proportion of their wealth in 
the risky asset which is opposite to the average proportion of wealth investe<! in that asset. The 
price dynamics in a market with fundamentalists and contrarian s is examined. Finally, Section 
6 presents our conclusions. 
2. OPTIMISTS, PESSIMISTS AND THE ASSET PRICE 
We consider an asset martet where there are two types of investors. One type of 
investors called "optimists", hold higher expectation about the rate of return of the risky asset 
than the other type of investors called "pessimists." Besides this assumption of heterogeneous 
beliefs, our model is very much a standard model of asset pricing model used in macro/f"mance 
literature. Tune is continuous and investors have infinite borizons. 80th types of agents are 
assumed to bave identical preferences with constant relative risk aversion, so their instantaneous 
utility function is c1 -'C U ( C) = -- ,where 't > O, 't - 1, 1-'t and where e stands for 
consumption. There are two types of assets, a riskless asset with an instantaneous rate of return 
r and a risky asset whose price is P(t). Let D(O be the total dividends accumulated for a sbare 
of the risky asset from time O 10 t Instantaneous dividends are thus dD(t). Let WO(t) be the 
wealth of the optimists, W'(t) the wealth of me pessimists and W(O = WO(O + W'(t) is the total 
wealth in me economy. Let 1 1 ( t) be the proportion of wealth tbat an agent of type i invcsts 
in the risky asset and c'(t) the proportion consumed out of total income. Givcn the assumptions 
about the return of the assets, wealth evolves according to the following equation: 
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dW.1 (t) = ()..1 (t) dP( t) +dD( t) + (1-)..1 (t» rdt-c.1 (t) dt)W.1 (t) 
P(t) , (1) 
i= o, p 
The agents believe that the process followed by the retums of the risky asset is 
detennined by, 
dP(t) +dD(t} = aJ,dt + PdB(t} 
P( t} 
where i is equal to o for the optimists and p for the pessimists and a o > al) . Thus, optimists 
expect higher retums than pessimists for a given level of risle. We assume that the agents never 
change their beliefs. The influence of each belief on the assel price, however, changes as the 
wealth distribution between the two types of agent changes. It may be more realistic 10 assume 
that some agents change their beliefs ü their strategy yields much lower returns than the 
altemative one, but such an assumption will not change the qualitative results. Under this 
assumption, a successful strategy would increase the influence through two channels. The wealth 
of the agents thal use the strategy grows faster, and, al the same time, the strategy gains some 
new converts. Thus, the dynamics of the model would qualitatively look the same. 
The objecu.e of tbe ageDIS is ID maximi.., B V. .-'·U[C(sll ds} subject ID tbe 
budget constraint (l), and C(t) > O; W'(t) > O; W'(O) = Wo > O. Under these cooditions ud 
assuming p > ( 1 -'t ) [ (a 1-x) 2 + xl ' which always holds when the agent is more risk . 
2a2 -r 
8 
averse than an agent with logarithmic utility, the demand for the risky asset by each type of agent 
will be a constant proportion of their total wealth, as Menon (1969) shows. Merlon (1969) also 
shows that letting A,1 be the proportion of the risky asset in the portfolio of a type i agent 
A,1 = u 1 - r ,and letting cl be the proportion of consumption on wealth, 
't'JP 
e 1 = _ p - ( 1 -'t' ) 1 + r . l( [ (u -r) 2 ]) 
't' 2a2 't' 
If we let N(t) be the total number of shares outstanding at time t, market clearing implies, 
or if we let q( t) 
A,°WO(t) + A,J'WJ'(t) = P(t)N(t) , (2) 
WO( t) 
= -W~(t-:)~ 
A,°q(t) + A,J'(l-q(t» = N(t)P(t) (2') W(t) • 
The finn that issucd the sbares is assumed to have instantaneous profits of 
This will be the case ü, far example. dcmand is a fixed proportion of total wealth, the price of 
the good is constant and the average 0051, which fluctuates randomly over time. is the same for 
a11 levels of production at any given instant of time. The fum uses the profits to buy back its 
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shares and pay out dividends, so that 
dn· (t) = - dN( t) (P( t) +dP( t» + N( t) dD( t) (3) 
U sing the market equilibrium condition (2) and the relation between asset retums and the 
profits process given by (3), we can solve for the process of equilibrium asset retums. Then by 
using (1) and lto's formula, we can derive the stochastic process q(t), the proponíon of wealth 
held by the optimists1• This is done with the following proposition. 
Proposition A. 
a) dP( t) +dD( t) = .--l°cOq( t) -lPcP(l-q( t) ) dt + rdt 
P(t) 1°(1-1°)q(t) +lP (1-1P ) (l-q(t» 
+ 1 odB(t). (5) 
1°(1-1°) q( t) +lP (1-1P ) (l-q( t» 
_CO-CP]dt _ q(t) (l-q(t» (l°-lP) (1°q(t)+lP(1-q(t»o2 dt l°-lP (1°(1-1°)q(t)+lP (1-1P) (1-q(t»)2 
+ q( t) (l-q( t» (l°-lP) o dB( t) , 
l°(l-l°)q(t) +lP(l-lP) (l-q(t» 
Proof: See the Apppendix. 
The proposition shows that the equilibrium asset retums dcpend on random shocks lO the 
profits. More importantly, the proportion of optimists' wealth, q(t), affects the equilibrium asset 
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returos. The dynamics of q(t) is given by the latter half of the proposition. 
The next section studies the asymptotic properties of the dynamics of q(t). Since the 
dynamics of asset returns critically depends on that of q(t), the knowledge of asymptotic 
properties of q(t) is necessary for us to understand the long run properties of asset return 
dynamics. To simplify the notation, we hereafrer write the dynamics of q(t) as, 
dq ( t) ... a (q ( t) ) d t + b (q ( t) ) dB ( t) • 
It is obvious from the proposition that, 
_ q( t) (l-q( t» (1°-1J) (l°g( t) +lJ)(l-g( t) ) 0 2 
(1°(1-1°) q( t) +1J)(1-1J) (l-q( t») 2 
b (q( t» = __ q~( t~).....:(~l_-.1q~( t~)...!.)...:(~1_0-...;,1;;",.J).:...) o~_ 
1°(1-1°) q( t) +1J)(1-1J) (l-q( t» 
3. ASYMPrOTIC BEBA VIOR OF TBE MODEL 
TIlis scction investigares SOlDe asymptotic properties of the process q(t). Let us fint 
defme the following, 
llJ. (O) 4 1C 4 I = f e -f 2a (q) d dx 
1 b(q)2' 
O • 
and 
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M(x):: 2 exp[f" 2a (q) dql 
b(X)2 • b(q)2 
where z is an arbittary number in (O. 1). As Gihman and Skorohod (1972) show I11 Ia and 
1 f M(x) dx are quite useful in studying the asymptotic properties of the process q(t). This 
o 
approaeh was used by Fudenberg and Harris (1992) 10 study the asymptotic properties of a class 
of evolutionary game dynamics. 
If II is inf"mite and 12 is finite the system converges 10 one almost surely. If 11 is finite 
and 12 is infinite the system converges 10 zero almost surely. If 11 and Iz are infinite and 
1 f M(x) dx is finite the system has a unique ergodic distribution with density 
o 
If 11 and Iz are finite the system converges 10 one with probability I 1 I 1 +Ia 
M(x) 
1 
¡M(y)dy 
o 
The function 11 measures the difficulty of converging 10 the state where q is zero. When 
a(O) is positive the detenninistic drift tends to push the dynamics away froro zero, thus, it is 
difficult for the dynamics 10 converge 10 that state. In 11 this is reflected in the faet that me 
exponent is positive (since x will be smaller tban z the integral and the sign in front of it are 
reversed) and very large, since a(O)Jb(Oj is infinite. When a(O) is neptive tbe deterministic drift 
tends 10 push tbe dynamics 10 zero, but it might still be that there is no convergence if the 
variance (diffusion) tenn is very Jarge. This is so because a run of good luck for tbe optimists, 
which eventually will happen because of me large variance, will makc their wealth grow fast fOl 
I a while, tItereby making it impossible that their wealth bccomcs negligible with respect 10 tIte . 
I 
I \ pessimists' wealth. 
i 
. 
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The function 12 measures the difficulty of converging to the state where q is one. When 
a(1) is negative the deterministic drift tends to push the dynamics away rrom one, thus, it is 
difficult to converge to that state. In 12 this is reflected in the faet that the exponent is positive 
and very large, since -a(l)Jb(1)2 is infinite. When a(1) is positive the deterministie drift tends to 
push the dynamics to one, but it might still be that there is no eonvergenee if the variance 
(diffusion) tenn is very large. This is so because a ron of good luek for the pessimists whieh 
eventually will happen because of the large varianee, will make their wealth grow fast for a 
while, thereby making it impossible that their wealth becomes negligible with respect to the 
optimists· wealth. 
Forourpurposes,definingafunction D(q) = 2a(q) q(l-q) makesthediseussion 
b(q)2 
easier. Note that D (q) is a bounded, continuously differentiable funetion in the interval [O. 
1]. Note also that both the a(.) and the b(.) funetions have a factor of q(1-q) whieh in D(.} cancel 
out so that D(.) is well defined and need not be zero when q is zero or one. 
Depending on the values of D(q) at q=O and q=l. there are four possibilities or the 
asymptotie dynamies of q which are identified in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. a} H D(O) > 1 and D(l) < -1 the process is ergodi~. b) H 
D(O) > 1 and D(l) > -1 the process converges to 1 JImost surely. e} H D(O) < 1 
and D(l) < -1 the process converges to O almost surely. d} If D(O) < 1 and 
D (1) > -1 the process converges to 1 with probability and to O with 
eomplementary probability. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The process under consideration has .. two absorbing states. zero and one, because there 
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is no detenninistic drift at these states and no stochastic variation either. Once you are broke you 
have nothing to start over with. That is why the values of D(O) and D( 1) are so importanL The 
function D(.) compares the strength of the detenninisóc drift to the variance of the noise tenn. 
When the variance is very large compared lO the drift there can be no convergence to the 
absorbing states because sooner or latcr a ron of good luck will happen for the less wealthy 
agents which will then become a little wealthier. When the drift is strong compared to the 
variance the stochasóc effects can be overcome and convergence can be achieved. 
Table 1 gives a visual exposióon of Proposióon 1. The table clearly shows that the 
values of D(O) and 0(1) are important in detennining the asymptotic propenies of the stochastic 
process q(t). The value of D(O) is important in detennining whether the process converges to 
zero with posióve probability. If 0(0) < 1, then the process q(t) converges to zero with a 
probability greater than zero. The probability becomes one when 0(1) < -1 also holds. If 0(0) 
> 1, however, the process never converges to zero. Similarly, the value of 0(1) is important in 
determining whether the process q(t) converges to one with a posióve probability. If 0(1) > -1, 
then the process converges to one with posióve probability. The probability becomes one when 
0(0» 1 also holds. If 0(1) < -1, the process never converges to one. 
We wiIl now show that a1l of the cases announced in Proposition 1 8Ie possible for SOlDe 
apen nonempty set of the parameter values of this modet Suppose that e o • CP • o . Since 
the inequalities in cases a) tbrough d) 8Ie strict, showing that all the cases 8Ie possible for an 
open nonempty set of the subset of the parameter space where the aboye equalities hold 
guarantees that all cases are also possible for an apen nonempty set of the whole parameter 
space. When the consumpóon rates are zero, 
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D(O) = 2 (.l" (l-l.P) ) Z [ 7t - l.POZ] (l.0-l.P)02 l.P(l-l.P) (l.P(1-l.P»2 
Thus D(O) > 1 ir and only ir 2 7t- > l.0+l." 
OZ l." (1-1") 
So D(l) (-1 if and only if 2~ ( 1°+1" . Thus we can distinguisb the 
OZ 10(1-10) 
four cases a) tbrougb d) in the proposition by comparing ro and 
b) 2 7t- > 1°+1" and 2 x- ) 1°+1" 
0 2 1°(1-1°) 0 2 1"(1-1") 
e) 2 ,,- ( 1°+1" and 
0 2 1° (1-1°) 
,,-
< 1°+1" 2-
0 2 1"(1-1") 
d) 1°+1" ( 2 ,,- ( 1°+1" 
1°(1-1°) 0 2 1"(1-11') 
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It is obvious that all cases are possible for a nontrivial set of parameters. As an example, 
Figure 1 idenúfies the four cases on AO-A" space. The case depicted in the figure as sumes 
2n* > 3+2~ • 
0 2 
Although the discussion aboye is useful in establishing that all the cases are indeed 
possible, the conditions derive<! there are hard lO interpreto By rewriting the inequalities in D(O) 
and 0(1) in Proposition 1, we can get a more intuitive interpretation oí those conditions. For 
example, noting that: 
11'02 _ eo-e"] 
(1P(1-AP»2 AO-AP 
D(O) > 1 is equivalent to: 
or multiplying (A 0_ A") 2 > O on both sides and rearranging, 
Note that 1 • (O) is the proportion oí wealth that tbe agents would invest in the risky 
asset ü tbey bad logarithmic utility and their beliefs were corrcct when q=O. that is, no optimists'. 
Inequality (7) is useful far interpreting the results in Proposition 1 in an intuitive way. Suppose, 
far the moment, that CO is equal 10 eP, that is the optimists and the pessimists consume al the . 
same rateo Then the last term on the left hand side of equation (7) vanishes, and whether the 
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inequality holds depends on whether the optimists' portfolio weight, AO , is closer to A· (O) 
than the pessimists' portfolio weight V'. First, let us consider the case when inequality (7) 
holds, that is when 0(0» 1. In this case, A o is closer to A • (O) ,which is me optima! 
strategy of a logarimmic utility maximizer when there are no optimists, implying mat optimists 
do better man me pessimists' when me share of me optimists' wealm is close to zero. Thus, 
whenever me optimists' share of wealm comes close lO zero, me optimists stan lO do better and 
inercase meir share of me wealm. Therefore, me optimists' share of me wealm never converges 
to zero in this case. If 0(0) < 1, so mat inequality (7) does not hold men me share of me 
optimists' wealm can end up being zero. When 0(0) < 1, whenever me optimists' share of 
wealm is close to zero, me pessimists are doing better and mey can inercase meir share until it 
converges lO one. Thus, as Proposition 1 shows, me optimists' sbare of wealm can converge to 
zero wim positive probability in this case. To interpret incquality (7), we have so far assumed 
mat CO = c'. Holding everything else equal, a CO greater than c' makes it easier far me optimists' 
share of me wealth lO converge to zero wim positive probability. Since a high consumption rate 
slows down wealth accumulation, the result malees sense. 
In a similar way, we can intuitively understand why the optimists' share of the wealth 
never converges lO one when D(I) < -1. One can easily show that D(l) < -1 is equivalent lO: 
Note that A • (1) is the proportion of wealth that the agents would invest in the risky 
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asset if they had logarithmic utility and their beliefs were correct at the state where q = 1, that 
is, when there are no pessimists. 
Again, let us start by assuming that CO = cp• Whether inequality (8) holds is determined 
by whether Al) is closer to A • (1) than A o • lf the pessimists' sttategy is in faet eloser 
to A • (1 ) ,whieh is the optimal sttategy of an agent with logarithmie utility and correet beliefs 
when there are no pessimists, then the pessimists start to do better whenever their share of wealth 
becomes clase to zero. Thus the share of pessimists' wealth never converges to zero; tltat is, the 
share of the optimists' wealth never converges to one. lf the optimists' sttategy is closer to 
A • (1) ,then the optimists dominate when the pessimists' share of wealth is small, and the 
optimists' share of the wealth converges to one with positive probability. 
If the rate of consumption differs between two types of illVestors, and r!' > el, then the 
inequality (8) becomes easier to satisfy. If the optimists consume at a higher rate, it is less likely 
for their share of wealth to converge to one. 
Our model may appear similar to the one developed by Blume and Easley (1992). Our 
results are, however somewhat different from those by Blume and Easley. In their model, if two 
types of investors invest eonstant, but different proportions of wealth in the risky asset, as they 
do in our model, one type of investors see their wealth eventually become very small relative to 
the other types' wealth. (Blume andEas1ey (1992), Proposition 3.1 and 3.2, p.I6). In our modcl, 
one type of investon may eventualIy dornioate the other (cases (b) and (e) in Proposition 1 ), but 
two types may co-exist even in the long ron (case (a». or both types have a ebance of 
dominating the market and the probability of one type eliminating the other depends on the initial 
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conditions (case (d». 
What is responsible for the difference is the presence of changes in the price level in the 
asset retums in our model. The Blume and Easley model considers assets thal pay state 
contingent payoffs. which do not depend on changes in the priees. Although changes in the price 
affeet the rate of return by changing the amount that the investors have lO pay to acquire the 
assets. the payouts are not affeeted. 
In our model the payouts of the risky asset include increases in the price. Sinee the priee 
changes as the distribution of wealth between the two types of investors changes, the uue process 
of the rate of return also changes in our model. As it is clear from Proposition A-(a), the 
stochastic process of equilibrium rate of retum has parameters that are functions of q, the 
optimists' share of the wea1th. When q changes. the true process of the rate of return changes. 
which in turn modiflCS the optimal strategy that would be used by an investor with correet 
beliefs. 
These effects of price changes are not present in the Blume and Easley model, because 
the price changes do not affeet payouts in their model. Renee the optimal strategy that would 
be used by an investor with correet beliefs in their model is a constant ponfolio strategy. Thus 
they can show that ü investors behave in a way that resembles more closely the constant 
portfolio strategy that would be chosen by an investor with correet beliefs and logaritbmic utility, 
then they tend lO dominate the market. (Blume and Easley (1992), Theorem S.2, p. 22). 
The optimal strategy for an investor with correct beliefs and logaritbmic utility is not a 
constant portfolio strategy in our model. The optimal strategy may be doser lO the optimists' 
strategy when q is small and doser lO the pessimists' when q is large. In this case, the optimists 
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stan to dominate when q gets small, pushing q away from zero. When q gets large, the 
pessimists start to dominate and keep q away from one. Thus the process of q converges to an 
ergodic distribution. 
H we allow investors in our model lO have non-constant ponfolio strategy, we can prove 
a proposition that is similar to Theorem 5.2 in Blume and Easley (1992). If one type of investors 
chooses a portfolio strategy that always differs from the (non-constant) optimal strategy that 
would be chosen by an investor with COlTCCt beliefs and logarithmic utility by more than the 
other strategy <loes, then such an investor' share of the wealth becomes asymplOtically negligible. 
Proposition 2. Suppose we have a riskless asset with rate of retum r, and a risky asset with rate 
of return, 
dP( t) +dD( t) .. el (t) dt + P (t) dB( t) 
dP(t) 
where el ( t), P (t) are bounded, measurable functions fOl a11 t and I P ( t) I > Ji > O 
for all t. Let 11 (t), A2 (t) be the investment sbares of agents 1 and 2 in the risky asset, 
which are also usumed lO be bounded and measurable, and suppose that both agents' 
consumption rafes are c1(t) and ¿(t). We will denote k 1 (t) • 11 (t) - el (t) -r for i = 1S2 (t) 
1,2. 
w1 (t) 
w2 (t) converges lO zero almost surely. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
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the fittest strategy when the pessimists' share of wealth is small and the pessimist strategy 
becomes fitter when the pessimists' share of wealth is small, allowing two strategies to coexist 
even in the long runo 
4. RELATIONSHIP WITH ARCH AND ARCH-M 
Our model implies that the process followed by asset retums has a time varying varianee. 
As equation (5) suggests, the standard deviation of the retums depends on q(t). which fluctuates 
over time. 
Time varying conditional heteroskedasticity of asset retums has becn documented by 
much empirical research that applied ARCH models to financial data. Those empírical studies 
found that the conditional varianee of asset retum is well capture<! by a stochastic process that 
depends on its own past. 
A class of ARCH models called ARCH-M (ARCH in mean) model considers me 
dependence of the mean rate of retum on the conditional variance. Thus the mean as well as the 
variance of rate of return becomes time varying in ARCH-M model. Our model also predicts 
the time varying average retums. 
This section examines the stochastic process of the conditional varianee of the asset 
returns implied by our model and argues that our model can give a theoretical justification for 
an ARCH-like model in fmanee. 
where 
Given what we found in section 2 me retums process can be written as: 
dP( t) +dD( t) .. ti (q( t» dt + V(q( t» dB( t) 
P( t) 
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+ I 
Since V is a monotonic function of q we can write q as a function of V. 
q = 1 (2. -A" (l-A"») • g( V) • By ltO's Lemma, 
AO(l-AO) -A" (l-A") V 
dV = V'(q( t) ) dq( t) + 1:. V"(q( t» V2 (q( t» dt 
2 
and noting that dq( t) = a (q( t) ) dt + b(q( t) ) dB( t) • and q = g(V) , 
dV( t) = v' (g( V( t) ) ) CE (g( V( t) ) ) dt + ~ v" (g( V( t) ) ) v 2 (t) dt 
+ V'(g(V( t») V( t) dB( t) 
which is a nonlinear. continuous time version of ARCH. since the conditional variance of the 
asset retums is time varying (thus heteroskedastic) and depends on its past (thus autoregressive). 
The relationship goes further since the conditional mean of the retums. a(q(t». also 
depends on q(t). and therefore on the variance since q = g(Y). So we can write. 
dP(t)+dD(t) = a(g(V(t»)dt + V(t)dB(t) 
P( t) 
This is a nonlinear version of ARCH-M. 
Another type of statistical models that capture a stochastic process with time varying 
parameters 81'e STAR models. A typica1 STAR model can be expressed as: 
where A(L) and B(L) are polynomials of lag operators. u is a white noise disturbance term. and 
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F is a transition function, which is bounded by zero and one. Thus a ST AR model assumes that 
the process of the variable in consideration is actuaUy a weighted average of two distinct AR 
processes and the weight depends on a lagged value of the variable and hence changes over time. 
This type of model was applied to sorne aggregate variables by Terisvirta and Anderson (1991) 
and Anderson (1992), but we do not know any application to financial data. 
Our model also implies that the dynamics of the asset returns moves between two 
extreme cases (the case when q = O and tbat when q = 1). The relationship witb the STAR 
model can be better secn by rewriting the asset price dynamics as 
dD( t) + dP( t) 
dP(t) 
+ dt+ dB t 1P (1-1P ) (l-q(t» ( ,,--lPe" o ) 
1°(1-1°)q(t)+lP (1-lP ) (l-q(t» 1P (1-1P ) 1P (1-1P ) () 
One difference between our model and STAR model is me conditional variance of me 
return process. As we saw above, our model implies time varying conditional variance. while 
a ST AR model· assumcs a constant variance. 
One may be able to sligbt1y modify our model to fmd a more direct link to me STAR 
model. This is one of the agendas fOl future research. 
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S. FUNDAMENT ALISTS AND CONTRARIANS 
This section studies a model in which sorne agents use marketwide information when 
making their investment decisions. The ftrst type of agents are called fundamentalists because 
they know the process which generates the profits of the fmn and they act in a way that would 
be oprimal if they were the only type of agents in the market. The second type of agents are 
called contrarians. They subscribe to the theory that the majority of agents are adopting wrong 
positions in the financial markets at all times, thus they adopt the opposite position 10 the average 
investment shares in the risky asset. 
As with the previous model there are two types of assets in the economy, a riskless asset 
with instantaneous rate of return r and a risky asset whose price is P(t). Let O(t) be the total 
amount of dividends accumulated for a share of the risky asset from time O to t, and dD(t) 
instantaneous dividends. At time t there are N(t) sbares outstanding of the risky asset. Let AP 
be the proportion invested by the fint type of agents in the risky asset out of their wea1th ~(t), 
and Ac{ t) the proportion invested by the contrarians in the risky asset out of their wealth 
WC(t). The total wealth in the economy, is W(t) = W"(t) + WC(t). The assumption about the 
contrarians is that A e ( t) • 1 -
Since the market portfolio puts 
P( t) N( t) . Contrarians assume tbat me marlcet is wrong 
W(t) 
P(t)N(t) 
W{ t) into the risky asset, contrarians put 
1 - P( t) N( t) W( t) into the risky asset and put 
P(t)N(t) 
W{ t) into me safe uset. 
We proceed very mucb in the same fasbion as we did in Section 2, and derive the 
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process for the equilibrium rate of return in this economy and the process for the contrarian s ' 
share of wealth, which is denoted by q( t) !! WC (t) 
WC ( t) +W' (t) 
or 
Market clearing implies: 
(1 - P(t)N(t) )q(t) + 1'(1 - q(t» W( t) 
P(t)N(t) 
= ---::-::W-=-( t':"":')"--'"-
( 1 - l' + 21' - 1 )W(t) = P(t)N(t) (12) 1 + q( t) 
Consumption far botb types of agents is asswned lO be a fixed pmportion of their wealth, 
¿ for the fundamentalists and ce far the contrarians. The evolution of wealth far eaeh type of 
investors given the assumptions about the asset returns and consumption, is 
cW"(t) -(11 (t) dP(~t:(t) +(l-l"(t) ) rdt-c 1dt)N1 (t> , (13) 
i- e, F 
The process far instantancous profits is again assumed to be: 
ck· (t) • (w·dt + odB( t) ) W( t) 
which is used lO buy back sbares or pay dividends. 
dK· (t) ,. - dN( t) (P( t) +dP( t» + N( t) dO( t) (14) 
Following similar steps to tbase taken in section 2 ID derive Proposition A, we can prove 
the following proposition which establishes tbe process of equilibrium asset retums and tbe 
contrarians' share of wealtb. 
Proposition B. Let 
and 
TIten, 
dP( t) +dD( t) P(t) = a(t)dt + b(t)dB(t) (15) 
dq(t) = c(t) + g(t)dB(t). (16) 
g( t) 
q( t) (l-q( t» 21'-1 
= _ _______ ....::l~+:.;¡q!..:(~t:.!..) __ o 
(1-1') 1'+ (21'-1) 2 2q( t) 2 
(1 +q( t) ) 3 
o - g( t) 21'-1 
b(t) = (l+q(t»)2 
(1-1') 1'+ (21'-1) 2 q( t) 
(l+q( t) ) 2 
c( t) = g~t) ['Jt. + 21' - 1 (1 + q(t»3 g (t)2 
(1 l' 21' - 1 ) + - + 1 + q(t) (-q(t) C C -(l-q(t» C F ) 
_ ( 21' - 1 g(t)b(t)(l _ l' + 21' - 1 )] 
1 + q( t) ) 2 1 + q( t) 
(1-1') l' + (21'-1) 2q( t) 
-q(t)(l-q(t»(c C-c') (1+q(t»2 
(1-1') 1'+ (21'-1) 22q( t) 2 
(1 + q(t»)l 
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1t* + 2lo' - 1 g( t) 2 
(1+q(t»3 
a ( t) = ----.:...::~--=-~-=----:-__:~ 
(1 - lo") A" + (2 A F - 1) q ( t) 
(1 +q(t»2 
2lo' - 1 
(1 + q( t) ) 2 e (t) _ 
(1 - A") A" + (2A' - 1) q{ t) 
(1 + q( t) ) 2 
proor: See the appendix. 
2A' - 1 g(t)b(t) 
(1 + q{ t) ) 2 
A" _ 2A' - 1 
1 + q{ t) 
cCq(t) + c'(l-q(t) + rdt 
A" _ 2A' - 1 
1 + q( t) 
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The e~ssions for c(t) and g(t) show that the drift and the diffusion tenns for the 
stochastic process q(t) are functions of q(t) itself, so we can write 
The limiting properties of the process q(t) can be found again by analyzing the function 
() al (q) q( 1-q) S· the fun· D(q)· . bo··-.:I_.:I d . 1 D q. ~ (q) 2 • mee cuon lS agam U1~ an conttnuous y 
differentiable in [O. 1) Proposition 1 direcdy applies. 
We can show that all four cases within the proposition are possible. We again show this 
for the case ce = c:! = O. Given that the inequalities in the proposition are strict, showing that. 
all the cases are possible for an open nonempty set of the subset of the parameter space where 
28 
CC = CF = O guarantees that all cases are also possible for an open nonempty subset of the whole 
parameter space. 
If CC = cF = O, D(O) > 1 if and only 27t* > 1 when ¡F < 1 and D(1) 
> -1 if and only if 
are reversed. 
b) 
e) 
0 2 ¡'(l-¡F) 
27t* < 2 +4A' when AY < 1 When ¡, > 1 
0 2 2 2 
a) ¡, > .! A 2 +4¡' < 27t* < 1 2 0 2 ¡'(l-¡') 
27t· 
0 2 
> 2 +4¡' A 
27t· < 2 +4¡F A 
0 2 
27t· < 2+4¡' A 
0 2 
21t· > 2+4¡' A 
0 2 
d) 
27t* 
0 2 
21t· 
0 2 
< 
21t· 
0 2 
21t· 
0 2 
> 
> 
< 
1 
¡"(l-¡') if 
¡JI' ( 
1 
¡, (l-¡") if ¡" > 
1 
¡'(l-¡') if 
¡, ( 
1 
¡'(l-¡') if ¡, > 
if ¡, ( 1 
2 
1 
¡JI'(l-¡') 
if ¡, > 1 
2 
2 
these inequalities 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
All of these four cases are possible for sorne parameter values of the modelo as Figure 
2 clearly demonstrates. 
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By rewriting the inequalities that incorporate 0(0) and 0(1), we can again intuitively 
understand the results. Noting that 
in this case, D(O) > 1 if and only if: 
Note that 1;(0) is tbe proportion of wealth that the agents with logarithmic utility 
would invest in the risky asset if their beliefs were correet al the statc wbere q=O, tbat is, when 
there are no contrarians. Suppose that both types of investors bave the same popensity to 
consume. Then whether 0(0) > 1 holds depends on whether the contrarian s ' investment strategy 
is closer to ).; (O) than the fundamentalists' investmcnt stratcgy. If tbis is the case, the sbare 
of the contrarians' wealth never converges to zem, because the contrarians do better wben their 
sbare of wealth is small. But if the fundamentalists' investmcnt strategy is closer to 1;(0) 
than the contrarians' investment strategy t then the share of wealth of tbe fundamcntalists will end j 
up being one, with positive probability, because tbe fundamentallsts do better wben the 
contrarian s ' sbare of the wealth is small. If their rates of consumption are different and if ce is 
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larger than ¿ the inequality in (22) will be more difficult to satisfy if everything eIse remains 
constant, since the contrarian s , higher propensit:)' to consume sIows down their wealth 
accumuIation. 
Similarly D(l) < -1 if and only if 
Note that 1; ( 1 ) is the proportion of wealth that an agent with logarithmic utility 
would invcst in the risky assct if their beliefs were correct at the stale where q= 1, that is, no 
fundamentalists. Suppose both types of investors have the same consumption rate. Then the 
fundamentalists' strategy is closer to 1;(1) than the conttarians' stratcgy, and the share of 
the wealth held by the fundamentalists will never converge to zero. But Ü the contrarians' 
sttategy is closer to 1; ( 1 ) than the fundamentalists' strategy, the shale of the wealth held by 
the contrarians will end up being oue with positive probability. A higher consumption ratc means 
a lower rate of wealth accumulation and therefore if C! is larger than (!= the inequality in (23) 
will be more difficult to satisfy, if everything eIsc remains constant. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Models with heterogeneous beliefs are potentially very important in explaining anomalies 
in the asset markets. With a few exceptions, however, the past lilerarure on the assct markets 
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with heterogeneous investors did not pay much attention to the dynamic aspect of the models. 
This paper is an attempt to advance the imponant research on the dynamic properties of the 
models of asset markets with heterogeneous investors, originated by De Long et al. (1990) and 
Blume and Easley (1992) among others. 
In this paper, we showed that the introduction of simple heterogeneity of beliefs into a 
simple model of asset pricing produces a rich dynamic of asset retums. Depending on the 
parameter values of the model, one type of investor may eventually have an infinitely larger 
wealth than the other investors, but it is also possible that two types of investors co-exist even 
in the long ron while they keep influencing the asset retums. 
One imponant empírical implication from our analysis is the presence of smooth regime 
shifts in the dynamics of asset retums, which are caused by the changes in the distribution of 
wealth among heterogeneous investors. As we have shown in Section 4, this implication is 
roughly consistent with a well mown empirical regularity in financial markets: we often find 
ARCH in asset retums. We have nOl, however, pUl this implication through rigorous testing, 
which is obviously an imponant agenda for future work. 
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Table l. Values of 0(0), O(l) and the asymptotic propenies of the q(t) process. 
0(1) < -1 0(1) > -1 
0(0) > 1 (a) ergodic distribution. (b) a. s. convergence to 
1. This is the limiting 
case of d) when 11 is 
infmite and Iz is fmite. 
0(0) < 1 (c) a. s. convergence to O. (d) convergence to 1 with 
This is the limiting case 
I 1 probability 
I 1 + Iz • of d) when 11 is finite and 
and to O with probability 
12 is finite. Iz 
I 1 + Iz 
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Figure l. The four cases from Proposition 1 for optimists and pessimists. 
)J> = 1 
Figure 2. The four cases from Proposition 2 for fundamentalists and contrarians. 
(e) 
Figure 2 
"p l+i7 
A =--r-
1 
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APPENDIX 
Proposition A. 
Proof: 
a) dP(t)+dD(t) = ",*-l°cOq(t)-ll'cl'(l-q(t» dt + rdt 
P(t) 1°(1-1°)q(t) +11'(1-11') (l-q(t» 
+ 1 adB(t). (5) 
1°(1-1°) q( t) +11'(1-11') (l-q( t» 
_ CO-C"]dt _ q( t) (l-q( t» (1°-1") (l°q( t) +l"(l-q( t) ) a2 dt 
1°-1" (1°(1-1°)q(t) +1"(1-1") (1-q(t»)2 
+ q( t) (l-q( t» (1°-l.") a dB( t) , 
l.0 (1-1°) q( t) +l." (1-l.") (l-q( t) ) 
Equation (2) implies: 
l°dWO (t) +l."dW" (t) • dN( t) (P( t) +dP( t) ) +N( t) dP( t). (4) 
Dividing equation (4) by W(t) and substituting (1), (2') and (3) into (4), 
li1odP(t) + dD(t) +(1-l.0)rdt-c Odt]q(t) 
P( t) 
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hence 
+ AiAPdP(t) + dD(t) +(l-AP)Idt-CPdt](l-Q(t» 
P( t) 
= -(,,·dt + odB(t» + dP(t)+dD(t) (q(t)AO + (l-q{t»A,P) 
P( t) 
Collecting the terms that are multiplied by dP( t) +dD{ t) 
P{ t) we gel, 
dP( t) +dD( t) [A,0 (1-A,0) q( t) +A,P (l-A,P) (l-q( t) )] :: ,,-dt+odB ( t) 
P( t) 
dP (t) +dD( t) = "--A,°C 0q( t) -A,J)cJ) (l-q( t) ) dt+rdt (5) 
P( t) A,°(1-A,°) q( t) +A,J)(1-A,J) (l-q( t» 
+ 1 odB( t) . 
1° (1-1°) q( t) +1J){1-A,") (l-q( t) ) 
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Applying Ita's formula to the dcfinitioo of q(t) and simplifying the resulting expression, 
dq( t) =q( t) (l-q( t) ) (A, 0-1") [ dP ( t) +dD (t) _ rdt- c o-C"] (6) 
P( t) 1°-1" 
_q( t) (l-q( t) ) (A,0_A,&') (lOq( t) +A,&'(l-q( t»( dP( t) +dD( t) )2 
P( t) . 
Substituting (5) into (6), 
_ q( t) (l-q( t» (A,0_A,&') (l°g( t) +lP (l-q( t) ) a 2 dt 
(10 (1-1°) q( t) +lP (1-1P) (l-q( t») 2 
or using more compact notation, 
Proposition B. Let 
and 
Then, 
dq(t) = a(q(t) )dt + b(q(t) )dB(t). 
dP(t) +dD(t) = a(t)dt + b(t)dB(t) (15) 
P( t) 
dq(t) = c(t) + g(t)dB(t). (16) 
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g( t) 
q( t) (1 - q( t» 2A' - 1 
= _ ________ ---..;;;l~+.....,¡q=_(::....t..:..) ___ a 
(1 - A') A F + ( 2 A' _ 1) 2 2 q ( t) 2 
(1 + q(t»3 
a - g( t) 2A1" - 1 
b(t) = ____________ ~(~1_+~q~(~t~)~)_2~~--
(1 - A') A' + (2A' - 1) 2 q( t) 
(1 + q( t) ) 2 
c(t) SI g(at ) ['K- + 2A1" - 1 g(t)2 
(1 + q(t»3 
+ (1 - A' + 2A1" - 1 ) (-q( t) e e - (l-q( t) ) e') 
1 + q( t) 
- 2A1" - 1 g( t) b (t) (1 - ).1" + 2).1" - 1 )] 
(1+q(t»2 l+q(t) 
(1-).1")11" + (2A1"-1)2q (t) 
- q( t) (1 - q ( t) ) (e e -e 1") ______ --.;;(....;;;l_+~q~( .;;.t=-»~2_ 
(1-)") )'1"+ (2).1"-1) 22q( t) 2 
(1 +q(t»3 
+ q(t) (1 - q(t»( 211" - 1 ) (1 _ ).1" + 211" - 1 )"(t)2 
1 + q( t) 1 + q( t) j 
,,_ + 2A1" - 1 (t)2 
a (t) = ___ ...:(:.;;;1~+--..lIq:..:.(~t:....:»:...3_g _ _ 
(1 - 11") l' + (2).1" - 1) q( t) 
(1+q(t»2 
Proor: Using Iw's rule 00 equatioo (12) we·get, 
211"-1 g(t)b(t) 
(l+q(t»2 
l' _ 21' - 1 
1 + q( t) 
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(1 + q(t) )2 C(t) _ 
(1 - i.,F) Al' + (2AF - 1) q( t) 
(1 + q( t) ) 2 
cCq{t) + c'(l-q(t) + rdt 
Al' _ 2AF - 1 
1 + q{ t) 
(_ 21'-1 dq(t)+ 21' - 1 (dq(t»2)W(t)J1 -1' + 21'-1 )dW(t) (1+q(t»2 (1+q(t»3 "\ l+q(t) 
- 21'-1 dq(t)dW(t) = (dP(t) +P(t»dN(t) +dP(t)N(t) (17) (l+q( t) ) 2 
Now substituting equations (12) and (14) into (17) and dividing by W(t). we get 
_ 21' - 1 dq(t) + 21' - 1 (dq(t»2 + (1 _ l' + 21' - 1) dW(t) 
(l+q( t) ) 2 (l+q( t» J l+q( t) W( t) 
21' - 1 dq( t) dW( t) (18) 
(1 +q( t) ) 2 W( t) 
• -"-dt-oda( t) + dP( t) +dD( t) (1-1'+ 21'-1 ) 
P( t) l+q( t) 
Since dW( e) -= dW C (e) + dW' ( e) 
dW(e) == q(e)(l - ¡C(e) )rde + ¡C(e) dP(e) +dD(e) - cCde) 
w(e) p(e) 
39 
40 
+ (1 - q(t»(l - ;"F)rdt + ;"I"dP(t)+dD(t) - cFdt) 
P( t) , 
using equation (13). Then, combined with equation (12), the above equation reduces to the 
following: 
dW( t) = (dP( t) +dDt) -rdt\( 1-;"1"+ 211"-1 ) (19) 
W( t) P( t) J\. 1 +q( t) 
+ rdt - q( t) cedt - (l-q( t) ) cl"dt 
Substituting (15), (16) and (19) into (18) we obtain 
- 21' - 1 dq( t) + 21' - 1 g( t) 2dt + 
(1 + q(t»2 (1 - q(t»3 
+ (1 -l' + 21' - 1 Y( dP( t) +dD( t) _ rdt)(l _ l' + 21' - 1 ) 
1 + q( t) ~ P( t) 1 + q( t) 
+rdt - q( t) cedt - (l-q( t» c'dt] 
_ 21' - 1 g(t)b(t>(l-l'> + 21' - l)dt (1 +q( t) ) 2 1 +q( t) 
=-".dt-odB(t) + dP(t)+dD(t)(1_1P + 21'-1) 
P(t) l-q(t) 
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Collecting the tenns that multiply dP ( t) + dO ( t) we find that. 
P( t) 
dP(t) +dD(t) (l-l/'+ 21" - 1 V1"- 21' - l)=".dt+OdB(t) 
P(t) l+q(t) " l+q(t) 
21' - 1 dq( t) + 21" - 1 g( t) 2dt + (20) 
(1 + q(t»2 (1 + q(t»3 
_ 21" - 1 g(t)b(t)(l _ 1") + 21" - 1. )dt 
(1. + q(t»2 1. + q(t) 
By Ito's rule, 
dq(t) = q(t) (l-q (t»( -(21'-1) VdP(t) +dD(t) -rdt+(cC-c') 1-q (t») 
1-q( t) 1\ P( t) 21'-1 
_ q( t) (1. -q( t» ( - (21" - 1.) X1. -1" + 21" - 1. " dP( t»)2 (21) 
1.+q(t) l+q(t) " P(t) 
Substituting (20) into (21) and then identifying coefficients in the resulting expression 
with (lS) and (16) the proposition follows. 
Proposition 1. a) H D (O) > 1 and D (1.) < -1 the process is ergodic. b) H 
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D (O) > 1 and D (1) > -1 the process converges to 1 almost surely. c) If D (O) < 1 
and D ( 1 ) < -1 the process converges to O almost surely. d) If D (O) < 1 and 
D (1) > -1 the process to 1 with probability and to O with complementary 
probability. 
Proof: The proof requires establishing two lemm8S. 
Lernma l. a) If D(O) > 1, I 1 is infinite. b) H D(O) < 1, I 1 is finire. 
c) If D(l) < -1, Iz is infmite. d) If D(l) > -1, Iz is fmire. 
Proof: a) If D(O) > 1 ,there is & > 1 and qa > O such that D(q) >& Vq<qa 
but 
.r • e~_¡CJa D (q) dq~ ¡Gil e4fGil D (q) d~dx} 
1 q(l-q) o q(l-q) 
• x 
q(O) 4 x ~ 
+ J e -J D (q) d dx, g(l-g) q, • 
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G'aJe4G'aJ D ( q) dqjdx ~ q¡Jexp[q¡J 6 d4dx q(l-q) q(l-q) 
o x o x 
G'a 4q¡ ] G'a Gi ( )a ~ J e ¡ ~dqdx = f exp6 (lnqa - lnx) dx = ¡ ~ dx, 
o x q o o 
q(O) 4 x j 
which is infinite since & > 1 . Since D(x) is bounded f e -J D (q) dq dx and 
q(l-q) G'a • 
e4-Gi¡ D(q) d4 are strictly positive. Thus Il is infinite. 
q(l-q) 
• 
If D(O) < 1 • there is <la > O and & < 1 - q. such that D(q) < & for all 
q<<la. 
I = e~_¡G'a D (q) dq~{ ¡'JI e4f'JI D (q) d4dx} 
1 q(l-q) q(l-q) 
• o x 
q(O) 4 Jl ~ + ¡ e -¡ D(q) dx 
q(l-q) , «la • 
but 
¡Gie_JG'a¡ D(q) aJdx ~ «lafe __ r¡Gi & dJdx 
o A1Jl q(l-q) c.lJ o lJl q(l-q) qJ 
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which is finite since & < 1 . Since D(x) is bounded, and q& and z are in the interval 
1-qa 
(0, 1), q(O) ~ x 1 f e -J D(q) dqdx q(l-q) 
<la • 
and e~-~J D (q) 04 are bounded. Thus I 1 
q(l-q) 
• 
is finite. One can show c) and d) in a similar fashion. 
1 
Lemrna 2: H D(O) > 1 and D(l) < -1 , JM(X) dx is fmire. 
o 
Proor: If D(O) > 1 and D(l) < -1 ,there are 1 > <la > q& > O , &1 > 1 and a 1 
&z < -1 such that D(q) > &1 for all q < <la
1 
and D(q) < &2 for all <P<laa • 
1 ~Q¡l 4{ q¡1 4 Gi1 4} !M(x)dx = e f D(q) d f 2 e -1 D(q) o dx o • q(l-q) o b(x)Z x q(l-q) 
IZe
z 4x 4 + 2 e D(q) dx J b(x) Z 1 q(l-q) 
1Ze1 • 
+ e D(q) 2 e D(q) d dx 4<la· 4Q 4 1Ze. 4 } { q(l-q) f b(X)2 - [ q(l-q) 
BUl 
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2 e D ( q) d ~ 2 e & 1 al dx q,1 xi q,1 1 q,1 xx{ ~ q. )] 
[ b(X)2 - [q(l-q) q [b(X)2 - 1 X 
wherethelastinequalityfollowsbecause O < q(t) < 1 andinthatintegral l-x> l-Cla
l 
which is fmite since 2 -&1 <1 . We also have, 
2 e D(q) d ~ 2 e & 1 1-x dx 1 ,K , 1 J b(x)Z J q(l-q) f b(x)Z xd- 2 nf 1-01 )] ~I ~a ~a ---l -, I 
where the last inequality follows because O < q ( t) < 1 and in tbat integral x > Ola 
which is finite since -&2-2 > -1 . 
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exp[o;J1 D (q) d4' q(l-q) 
Ir 
0;2 4% 4 2 e D(q) d J b(X)2 J q(l-¡) 
0;1 " 
and exp[q,JI D (q) d4 
q(l-q) 
.: 
are finite because D(x) is bounded and z, <4
1 
and <4a are in (O, 1). Then the Lemma 
Collows. 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 establish the proposition. 
Proposition 2. Suppose we have a riskless asset with rate oC retum r, and a risley asset with rate 
oC retum, 
dP( t) +dD( t) = CI (t) dt + P (t) dB( t) 
dP(t) 
where CI ( t) # P ( t) are bounded, measurable Cunctions for all 1, and I P (s) I > A for all 
s. Let 1 1 (t) # 12 ( t) be the investment sbares of agents 1 and 2 in the risky asset, which 
are also assumed to be bounded and measurable, and suppose that both agents consumption rates 
are c1(t) and c2(t). We will denote k 1 (t) = 11 (t) - CI (t) -r Cor i = 1,2. 1'2 (t) 
converges to zero almost surely. 
proor: Byequation (1) the evolution oC wealth is given by, 
i= 1, 2 
!..et h (t) = log ( w1 ( t») . By Ito's lemma. and equatioo (9) 
w2 (t) 
• P (t) 2((1 (t) _ CI (t) _r)2 _ (1 (t) _ CI (t) -r)2)dt 
2 2 'H t) 2 1 P ( t) 2 
t 
+ f (11 (S) -12 (s) ) P (s) dB(s) 
o 
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!..et J > IP (s) I > Jl, 'ti s ,and 1 > 111 (S) -12 (S) I > k·, 'ti S almost 
surely. 
By Gihman and Skorohod's (1972) theorem 1.1 p.lO 
Theo by Chebyshev's inequality. for all E> O 
( J (Al (S) - A 2 (S) ) P (S) dB ( S) )2 E sup ~o ___________________________ ___ 
2.~t~2.'1 t 
~ 1 E [ sup (i (Al (S) -12 (S» p (S) dB(S)]2] (2 12 ) 2 2.~t~2 ... 1 O 
( 
t (11 (S) -12 (S) ) P (S) dB(s) ) 
p SUp ..... o _______ ~-----' > E ~ 
2.~tll:2.·1 t 
Since t 8 (Ip) a 2-n < • , by the Borel-Cantelli lemma 
n-l Ea 
t 
lt~ ~f (11 (S) -12 (s» P (s) dB(s) .. O, a. s. (24) 
o 
By the assumption of the proposition, 
48 
49 
.!ft [P(S)2 «k (s)2-k (S)2)_(C 1 (S)-C 2 (S»)]dS (25) 
t 2 2 1 
O 
Equations (24) and (25) imply that almost surely 
Therefore h (t) ~ -CID almost surely, which implies that 
surely, which establishes the proposition. 
w1 (t) ~ O almost 
w2 (t) 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Ito's rule is the analog in stochastic differential calculus to the chain rule in ordinary 
calculus. Let X(t) be a stochastic integral (an Ito stochastic integral with respect to a continuous 
time stochastic process is defmed in a similar fashion as a Riemann integral, taking limits of 
surnmations of the discrete time processes with time intervals whose length decreases to zero): 
dX( t) = udt + vdB( t) 
Let (t,x)" g(t,x) € a; t € [O,.), x € a be ~ (Le. twice continuously 
differentiable) on [O,.) )( a. Then Y(t) = g(X(t» is again a stochastic integral, and 
dY( t) = -1t (t,X( t» dt + ~ (t,X( t» dX( t) + ~ ;:1 (t, x( t» (dX( t» 2, 
where dLdt = dLdB(t) = dB(t).dt = 0, dB(t)dB(t) = dL See, for example, 0ksendal (1989). 
2. When CO 1: el' = O then 
le 
/i( D(1) D(O»)d ( 1-X)-D(1)( X)D(O) • exp +- q. -- -1-q q 1-z z 
• 
51 
In the case when D(1) < -1 and D(O) > 1, then, the density of the ergodic distribution 
is proportional to 
M(x) = 2 ( (¡O(l-¡O) x+¡P(l-¡P) (l-x) ) 2( l-X)-DI1)(l!)DIO) (¡O_¡P)2a2x2(1_x)2 l-z z 
3. H an investor has logarithmic utility and expects the risky asset ro follow a stochastic 
pracess given by u (t) dt + P (t) dB (t), and the riskless asset retum to be r. then the 
optimal proponíon of wealth invested in the risky asset is u(t)-r . P 2· In our modelo if the ( t) 
investor has correet beliefs. then 
u(t) = 1t*-¡OcOq(t)-¡PC.P(l-q(t» +r 
¡O(l-¡O)q(t) +¡P(l-¡.P) (l-q(t» 
substituting this into u(t)-r P ( t) 2 • • we get 
as the proportion of the risky asset in the ponfolio of such an investor. Wheo q = O. the aboye 
expression simplifics to: 
52 
which is the definition of A • (O) . 
4. "SufficientIy large" depends on the variance tenn, as equation (25) in the appendix 
malees clear. Stating precisely the condition would lead to a cumbersome Proposition 2 and add 
little to the intuition, therefore it is omitted. 
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